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CASES NOTED
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW-
TAFT-HARTLEY ACT
The National Labor Relations Board issued a cease and desist order
against petitioner for unfair labor practices, under the authority of the Wag-
ner Act.1 The Circuit Court denied enforcement of the order, subsequent
to the passage of the Administrative Procedure Act and of the Taft-Hartley
Act which were admittedly the controlling statutes. The court did not con-
sider whether the requirements in the aforementioned acts, that labor board
findings be in accordance with law and supported by substantial evidence
on the "Whole record, had extended the scope of judicial review.2  The
Supreme Court remanded the case for consideration of the effect of the
Administrative Procedure Act and of the Taft-Hartley Act on the scope of
judicial review of National Labor Relations Board findings.8 Held, that
more effective judicial review of Board findings was initiated by the Admin-
istrative Procedure and Taft-Hartley Acts and that the Board's findings were
not sustained by substantial evidence on the recoid considered as a whole.
Pittsburgh S. S. Co. v. NLRB, 180 F.2d 731 (6th Cir. 1950).
Under the Wagner Act, National Labor Relation Board findings were
based on all the testimony' and were conclusive if supported by evidence.5
Both the Administrative Procedure Act and the Taft-Hartley Act, however,
require that the findings be supported by substantial evidence on the re-
cord considered as a whole.7 The Board was not bound by any rules of
evidence by express provision in the Wagner Act,8 and this was not changed
in the Administrative Procedure Act. However, the Taft-Hartley Act re-
quires that the Board proceed, so far as is practicable, in accordance with
the rules of evidence of the district courts of the United States10 and act
only in accordance with the preponderance of evidence.'
The Administrative Procedure Act generally was believed to call for a
snore critical examination of administrative findings by the courts, but judi-
1. Pittsburgh S.S. Co., 69 N.L.R.B. 1395 (1946).
2. Pittsburgh S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 167 F.2d 126 (6th Cir. 1948).
3. NLRB v. Pittsburgh S.S. Co., 337 U.S. 656 (1949).
4. 49 STAT. 454 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 160 (c) 1946) (Wagner Act).
5. 49 StAT. 454 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 160 (e) (1946) (Wagner Act).
6. 60 S'A'r. 244 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (e) (1946) (Administrative Procedure
\dt): 61 STAr. 148 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160 (c) (Supp. 1946) (Taft-Hartley Act).
7. 60 Srt.'r. 241 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1006 (c) (1946) (Administrative Procedure
A, t); 61 STAT. 148 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160 (e) (Supp. 1946) (Taft-Hartley Act).
R. 49 STAT. 454 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 160 (b) (1946) (Wagner Act).
9. 60 STA'r. 244 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (c) (1946) (Administrative Procedure
Act).
10. 61 SUAT. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160) (b) (Supp. 1946) (Taft-Hartley Act).
11. 61 SI,r. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 16) (c) (Supp. 1946) (Taft-Hartley Act).
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cial interpretation has not sustained that belief.12 It was hoped that the
Taft-Hartley Act would succeed where the Administrative Procedure Act
failed.' By requiring the NLRB to follow rules of evidence, Congress ex-
pected to do away with unfounded inferences which courts had been re-
luctant to set aside in deference to the specialized knowledge supposedly
inherent in administrative boards.' Congress anticipated that expert in-
ference would not satisfy the requirement that the Board act only on a
preponderance of the testimony.1"
Weighing of the evidence by a reviewing court was not considered with-
in the scope of judicial review under the Adminstrative Procedure Act"0 or
the Taft-Hartley Act 1 for to do so would be to burden the courts with cases
de novo.1 By inserting the statutory provisions in the Taft-Hartley Act
allowing only legally admissible, competent and relevant evidence and re-
quiring determination in accordance with the preponderance of the evidence,
Congress expected to materially extend the scope of review."0 The courts
would have to see that the statutory requirements were observed by the
Board and determine questions of law which would be raised.
Prior to the instant case the weight of authority has been that the scope
of judicial review was not extended by the Administrative Procedure Act
and the Taft-Hartley Act.20 While the courts recognize that the Congress-
ional intent was to broaden the scope of judicial review, they have held that
the Congress failed in its intent.2' The reviewing court cannot weigh the
evidence because there cannot be a trial de novo.22 Consideration of the
whole record has not been interpreted as allowing the courts to weigh evi-
dence or to make independent findings of fact, but to require them to find
substantial evidence on the whole record rather than only on one side? 8
Congress apparently believed some courts had been satisfied with substan-
tial evidence on one side only.24 The power to draw inferences, decide
facts and determine credibility of witnesses remains in the Labor Board."
A determination by the NLRB is similar to a jury verdict which may
12. H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 1162 (1947).
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Id. at 1159.
16. See Willapoint Oysters, Inc. v. Ewing, 174 F.2d 676, 685 (9th Cir. 1949).
17. H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 1159 (1947).
18. Id. at 1162.
19. Ibid.
20. But ee NLRB v. Caroline Mills, Inc., 167 F.Zd 212, 213 (5th Cir. 1948)
("there total purpose has been .. .to give the courts more latitude on review."); NLRB
v. Tappan Stove Co 174 F.2d 1007, 1008 (8th Cir. 1949) ("In the matter of factual
review, the Taft-Hartley Act... merely broadened the Wagner Act .... ").
21. See NLRB v. Austin Co., 165 F.2d 592, 595 (7th Cir. 1947); NLRB v. Con-
tinental Oil Co.; 179 F.2d 552, 555 (10th Cir. 1950).
22, NLRB v. Austin Co., supra note 21.
23. See Willapoint Oysters, Inc. v. Ewing, supra note 16 at 689.
24. NLRB v, Universal Cameria Corp 174 F 2d 749, 752 (2d Cir. 1950).
25. See, e.g., Victor Mfg. & Gasket do. v. NLRB, 174 F.2d 867, 868 (7th Cir.
1949); Eastern Coal Corp. v. NLRB, 176 F.2d 131, 135 (4th Cir. 1949); NLRB v.
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 179 F.2d 323, 325 (8th Cir. 1950).
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he set aside only if not supported by substantial evidence." The courts are
in the same position as they were under the Wagner Act in reviewing to
determine whether or not there is substantial evidence to sustain the find-
ings on the record as a whole.27 The provisions in the Wagner Act that
findings supported by evidence are conclusive is qualified in both 'the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act and the Taft-Hartley Act by the word "substan-
tial". 28 But the Supreme Court has interpieted the word "evidence" in the
Wagner Act as meaning substantial evidence.2 ' The courts have said that
all that has been done by the statutes is to make definite what was already
implied by the courts.'0
The principal case, though not alone in holding that the scope of judi-
cial review has been broadened,81 appears to be the strongest on the side it
takes. Certainly there are changes in procedure by the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act and the Taft-Hartley Act, but whether or not there ias been a
substantial broadening of judicial review is not obvious. The majority of
cases recognize that it was the intent of Congress to broaden the scope
of judicial review but that they were not successful. The court in the instant
case has rendered the decision with deference to interpretations by the mem-
bers of Congress in the Congressional reports of both the Administrative
Procedure Act and the Taft-Hartley Act. While, strictly speaking, the scope
of review may not have been extended, the practical effect is a lessening of
power in the National Labor Relations Board by the abolition of hearsay
and expert inferences unsupported by evidence.
BAILMENT - USE OF COIN OPERATED LOCKERS
Defendant rented coin operated lockers to the public retaining dupli-
cate keys which were used to remove goods left overtime. Plaintiff placed
jewelry in one of the lockers, locked it, took the key; and, opening the locker
within the time allowed for storage, he found the jewelry missing. An action
based on constructive bailment was brought by the plaintiff to recover the
value of the goods stored. Held, that since the defendant could not exclude
the plaintiff's access to and control over the plaintiff's property, the ex-
clusive possession and physical control essential to a constructive bailment
were absent and no recovery was allowed. Marsh v. American Locker Co.,
72 A.2d 343 (Super. Ct. N.J. 1950).
In both actual and constructive bailment the common law relationship
26. See NLRB v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., supra note 25.
27. See NLRB v. Continental Oil Co., supra note 21.
28. See note 6 supra.
29. See NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 299 (1939).
30. See NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., supra note 24.
31. See note 20 supra
